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Jones v. City of Los Angeles: In Search of a




The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued a decision in Jones v. City of Los Angeles' declaring that
enforcement of L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2005) violated
Appellants' Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual
punishment. Appellants were homeless people who lived in the
area of Los Angeles known as Skid Row.2 Appellants' various
sources of support from Social Security, General Relief, food
stamps, and other programs left them unable to purchase housing
in a hotel every night, and they were not always able to obtain a
bed in a free shelter. 3 The number of homeless in Skid Row in
particular, and in Los Angeles generally, exceeded the number of
available shelter beds.4 As a result of their inability to procure
shelter, appellants were arrested and/or cited in violation of the
aforementioned code, which prohibits any person from sitting,
lying, or sleeping in or on any street, sidewalk, or other public
way.5 The court held that in these specific circumstances-where
the number of homeless people exceeded the number of available
beds-enforcement of the ordinance would violate appellants'
Eighth Amendment rights.6
Part I of this Article will illustrate the context for the Jones
J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School. The author wishes to
thank the staff and editors of Law and Inequality for their efforts in bringing this
piece to publication, her family for their patience and understanding, and her
husband, Zac, for his invaluable advice, constant support, and unending
encouragement.
1. 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 1124-25.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1122.
5. Id. at 1123-25.
6. Id. at 1138.
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decision through an examination of the history of homelessness,
anti-homeless statutes, and the case law pertinent to an Eighth
Amendment challenge for punishment of status. Part II will
explain the Jones holding and its use of the precedents set forth in
Robinson v. California,7 Powell v. Texas,8 and Ingraham v.
Wright.9 Part III will examine the strength of the Jones holdings
with regard to standing and protection of status, and criticize the
applicability of the test formulated by the majority. It will argue
that, in addition to formulating an unworkable test, the limits of
the majority's holding effectively hamstrings future challenges to
anti-homeless legislation by requiring a showing of a lack of
available shelter while negatively implying that cities can
effectively force homeless people into shelters. This Article will
also examine the contention, advanced elsewhere, that a model
exempting life-sustaining acts from criminal punishment is
preferable to a judicial inquiry of the type undertaken in Jones.
I. The Law Prior to Jones
A. The Evolving Problem of Homelessness in the United
States
Historically, homelessness has been targeted through the use
of vagrancy statutes. 10 The criminalization of vagrancy dates back
to the fourteenth century enactment of the Statutes of
Labourers. 11  In sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe,
vagrants were beaten or confined with the aim of eliminating
idleness and teaching the virtues of labor.12  During the
nineteenth century in the United States, the vagrants' presumed
idle nature and potential criminality motivated the passage and
7. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
8. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
9. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
10. See LEONARD C. FELDMAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT SHELTER: HOMELESSNESS,
DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL EXCLUSION 30-31 (2004) (detailing vagrancy laws
beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
11. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis
of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV.
631, 635 (1992).
12. Id. at 31; see also Donald E. Baker, 'Anti-Homeless" Legislation:
Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 427 n.52
(1990) (noting the justifications for punishing vagrancy in the English common
law).
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enforcement of vagrancy statutes.13 Vagrancy laws remained in
force in the United States through the first half of the twentieth
century. 14
The face of homelessness in the United States has changed
significantly over the past 150 years. 15 In the nineteenth century,
the homeless population consisted largely of the unemployed or
periodically employed, poor, men, and immigrants. 16 Today the
homeless population is demographically diverse. 17 During the
1980s and 1990s, women and children were among the fastest
growing segments of the homeless population.' 8 A survey of
twenty-five cities in 2000 found that "single men" and "families
with children" composed roughly equal portions of the homeless
population, with "single women" and "unaccompanied youth"
trailing behind. 19
Due to either more detailed study of homelessness or as a
result of the changing population, or perhaps a combination of
both, the causes of homelessness also seem to have evolved. This
does not mean that a certain event can be identified as the cause
of any single person's homelessness, 20 or that the causes of
homelessness generally may be clearly delineated. 21 A multitude
of interdependent factors, such as the availability of affordable
13. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 31-32.
14. Id. at 34.
15. See GERALD P. DALY, HOMELESS: POLICIES, STRATEGIES, AND LIVES ON THE
STREET 51-88 (1996) (giving an overview of the homeless population from the late
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century); JEAN CALTERONE
WILLIAMS, "A ROOF OVER MY HEAD": HOMELESS WOMEN AND THE SHELTER
INDUSTRY 1 (2003) (stating that women and children compromise a "surprising"
subset of the "new" homeless).
16. See DALY, supra note 15, at 52-54 (discussing the composition of the
homeless population in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries);
WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century homeless population consisted of "hobos and itinerant workers").
17. Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization,
14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 5-6 (1996); Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is
Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 506
(2003).
18. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 1.
19. See Watson, supra note 17, at 506 ("In 2000, the U.S. Conference of Mayors
reported that, of the twenty-five cities surveyed, 'single men comprise 44% of the
homeless population, families with children 36%, single women 13%, and
unaccompanied youth 7%."').
20. See WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 19 (stating that it is "impossible to find one
reason to explain each woman's homelessness").
21. MARTHA R. BURT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., STRATEGIES
FOR PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS xii-xiii (2005).
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housing and government assistance, medical emergency,
unemployment, drug use, and mental illness work to render single
men and women, as well as families, homeless.22
Congress has defined a "homeless person" as someone who
"lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence," and
whose primary nighttime residence is a privately or publicly
operated shelter, an institution, or a "public or private place not
designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping
accommodation for human beings."23 This definition of a subset of
the population entitled to receipt of assistance makes no reference
to the reason the individual lacks an adequate residence. 24 That
is, the text of the definition and description of assistance
entitlements reveal no congressional conclusions about the
voluntary or involuntary nature of homelessness. 25
B. Robinson, Powell, and the Problems of Status and
Conduct
In 1962, the Supreme Court struck down a California law
that made it illegal to "be addicted to the use of narcotics."26 The
decision in Robinson was based in the idea that the state may not
criminalize status.27 Accepting that the state has broad power to
regulate narcotic drug traffic by a variety of means, the Court
22. KURT BORCHARD, THE WORD ON THE STREET: HOMELESS MEN IN LAS VEGAS
56-102 (2005); WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 19-56. Borchard and Williams both
identify several factors which contribute to the homelessness of one gender more
than the other. For example, domestic violence and single motherhood often
contribute to women's homeless condition, while many homeless men have recently
been released from prison. BORCHARD, supra note 22, at 87; WILLIAMS, supra note
15, at 19-26, 34-35. In addition, while the homeless women in Williams' study
typically had strong social networks of friends or family, the men in Borchard's
study often did not. BORCHARD, supra note 22, at 89; WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at
47.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (2006).
24. See id. § 11302(b).
25. Id. § 11302 (2006).
26. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661 (1962) (citing CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11721).
27. See Christine L. Bella & David L. Lopez, Quality of Life-At What Price?:
Constitutional Challenges to Laws Adversely Impacting the Homeless, 10 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 89, 101 (1994); Robert C. McConkey III, "Camping
Ordinances" and the Homeless: Constitutional and Moral Issues Raised By
Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Public Areas, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 633, 641 (1996);
Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for
Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 309 (1995);
Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-Or-Die Acts
of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1621 (1995).
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observed that this law did not punish a person for any act, such as
using or buying narcotics, or for undesirable behavior resulting
from the use of narcotics. 28 Likening drug addiction to mental
illness, leprosy, and venereal disease, the Court noted that "a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless
be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."29 The Court concluded that a law that punishes a
person solely on the basis of their addiction inflicts a cruel and
unusual punishment. 30
After Robinson, if the state could not punish an individual for
suffering from a disease, then it was unclear whether it was
constitutional to punish an individual for acts caused by a
disease.31 Six years later, Powell refined the Robinson doctrine.
Noting that the defendant, Leroy Powell, had been convicted "not
for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk,"
the Court concluded that the state "has not sought to punish a
mere status .... Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a criminal
sanction for public behavior."32
The decision in Powell seems to limit the rejection of a
statute for targeting a status only to those cases in which the state
has failed to target an act or behavior,33 however, the opinion was
rendered by a divided court, and only four Justices signed on to
the plurality opinion.3 4 Justice White, who concurred in the
result, and four dissenting Justices rejected the plurality's
interpretation of Robinson.35  Justice Fortas, writing for the
dissent, read Robinson as standing for the principle, that
"[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being
in a condition he is powerless to change." 36 Justice White did not
vote with the dissent because he doubted both that Powell was
28. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664-66.
29. Id. at 666.
30. Id. at 667.
31. Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 929 (1969). Greenawalt
notes that lower courts were divided in their interpretations of the Robinson
doctrine. Id. at 929 n.16.
32. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
33. Walters, supra note 27, at 1624-25.
34. Powell, 392 U.S. at 516-17.
35. Smith, supra note 27, at 315-16; Walters, supra note 27, at 1625.
36. Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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physically compelled to drink37 and that he could not have taken
measures to prevent himself from appearing in public while
drunk.35 However, Justice White focused on the ability of Powell
and other hypothetical alcoholics to resist the compulsion to drink
and to control their movements while drunk.39 In other words,
Justice White and the dissent both focus on the volitional nature
of the defendant's act.
Most significantly in the context of challenges to anti-
homeless ordinances, Justice White included some language in his
opinion which may be read to support challenges to ordinances
that punish the homeless for life-sustaining acts:
Although many chronics have homes, many others do not. For
all practical purposes the public streets may be home for these
unfortunates, not because their disease compels them to be
there, but because, drunk or sober, they have no place else to
go and no place else to be when they are drinking. This is
more a function of economic station than of disease, although
the disease may lead to destitution and perpetuate that
condition. For some of these alcoholics I would think a
showing could be made that resisting drunkenness is
impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is
also impossible. As applied to them this statute is in effect a
law which bans a single act for which they may not be
convicted under the Eighth Amendment - the act of getting
drunk.40
Because of the divided opinion in Powell, lower courts have
been left without clear direction in their treatment of laws that
37. Id. at 551 n.3 (White, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 553 (White, J., concurring); Walters, supra note 27, at 1626.
39. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 549-53 (White, J., concurring).
[T]he chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge to consume alcohol
should not be punishable for drinking or for being drunk .... For
some of these alcoholics I would think a showing could be made that
resisting drunkenness is impossible and that avoiding public places
when intoxicated is also impossible .... It is also possible that the
chronic alcoholic who begins drinking in private at some point
becomes so drunk that he loses the power to control his movements
and for that reason appears in public .... [N]othing in the record
indicates that [Powell] could not have done his drinking in private or
that he was so inebriated at the time that he had lost control of his
movements and wandered into the public street.
Id.
40. Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring). White's most revolutionary statements
from the perspective of the post-Reagan 'War on Drugs" era came in the opening
sentences of his opinion: "If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion
to use narcotics (citation omitted), I do not see how it can constitutionally be a
crime to yield to such a compulsion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts
for addiction under a different name." Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
[Vol. 25:2
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target conduct "derivative of status."4 1 Subsequent developments
in vagrancy law, explored later on this Article, led cities to develop
new strategies for managing homeless individuals in an attempt to
avoid application of the Robinson doctrine.
C. Ingraham and the Limits of the Prohibition on Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham,42 legal
scholars described the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment as limiting the execution of the criminal
law in three ways: limiting the methods of punishment, ensuring
that punishment is proportionate to the crime, and requiring
sentencing that is fair and not arbitrary such that one defendant
does not receive a punishment far more severe than those imposed
upon others who have committed the same crime.43 At the same
time, scholars recognized that the Court's holding in Robinson
"limited the states' power to define crime," 44 an interpretation
drawn from Justice Douglas's concurring opinion which
acknowleded that the state lacked the "power to punish a person
by fine or imprisonment for being sick" and that "cruel and
unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from
convicting the addict of a crime."45 Ingraham, in turn, changed
how the limits imposed by the cruel and unusual punishment
clause are defined.
Ingraham held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unsual punishment did not prohibit schools from
inflicting physical punishment.46 The Court first noted that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment derived from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, aimed at preventing judges from
imposing excessive bail or fines, or illegal punishments.47 When
the Founders incorporated this language into their own state and
federal constitutions, they "feared the imposition of torture and
other cruel punishments not only by judges acting beyond their
lawful authority, but also by legislatures engaged in making the
41. Smith, supra note 27, at 317.
42. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977).
43. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 635-36 (1966).
44. Id. at 646.
45. Id. (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
46. Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977).
47. Id. at 664-65.
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laws."48  In either case, the Court concluded, the provision was
intended to apply only to the criminal process. 49
The Ingraham Court then described three ways the Cruel
and Unsual Punishment Clause limits the criminal process. First,
it limits the type or method of punishment that can be imposed on
convicted persons. 50 Second, it requires that punishment not be
grossly disproportionate to the convicted crime.51  Third, it
substantively limits "what can be made criminal and punished as
such."5 2 The Court qualified the third limitation by recognizing it
"as one to be applied sparingly."5 3 In spite of the emphasis the
Court placed on the infrequency with which the third limitation
should be applied, courts have utilized the third branch of
protection to invalidate vagrancy laws. 54 In the homeless context,
the third branch has been used on several occasions to invalidate
laws that punish life-sustaining acts, such as sleeping or eating in
public.55
D. Papachristou: Shifting Laws and Subsequent Challenges
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,56 the Supreme Court
invalidated a Jacksonville ordinance that punished individuals
classified as "vagrants" based on more than twenty different
characteristics and behaviors, such as "rogues," "vagabonds,"
"common drunkards," and "persons wandering or strolling around
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object."57
Grounding the decision in the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause, the Court found the vagrancy law void for
48. Id. at 665.
49. Id. at 666.




54. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 64 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated
on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (finding vagrancy law unconstitutional
because it punishes mere status); Alegata v. Commomwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201, 207
(Mass. 1967) ("Idleness and poverty should not be treated as a criminal offense.")
55. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (arresting the homeless for life sustaining acts consitutes cruel and unusual
punishment); Church v. City of Huntsville, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20429, at *1-2
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1993), vacated on other grounds 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994)
(enjoining the City from removing homeless people and from harassing them for
actions, including sleeping, in public parks).
56. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
57. Id. at 156-57.
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vagueness because of it failured to give fair notice and it
encouraged arbitrary arrests. 58
As a result of the decisions in Robinson, Powell, and
Papachristou, cities began to shift their focus when drafting anti-
homeless legislation. Contemporary anti-homeless efforts include
laws that prohibit all sleeping in public places and those that
restrict sleeping at certain times or in certain places, as well as
coordinated efforts to simply remove homeless individuals from
cities. 59 In addition, cities use "existing but often unenforced
laws-such as prohibitions on loitering, littering, jaywalking, and
carrying open containers--selectively against homeless people."
60
In response, advocates for the homeless have attacked these
laws, both as applied and on their face, in different ways.61 For
example, restrictions on panhandling have been primarily
challenged as infringements on the First Amendment right to free
expression. 62 Courts are divided in both their treatment of these
First Amendment challenges, as well as their answers to the
prerequisite question of whether panhandling constitutes pure
conduct or expression.63 Panhandling ordinances have also been
challenged on the basis of equal protection,64 and some scholars
have argued for the characterization of the homeless as a suspect
class for purposes of review under the Equal Protection Clause. 65
Restrictions on the use of public space similar to the one at issue
in Jones have been challenged on both Eighth Amendment
grounds and as restrictions of the right to travel.
66
Several court claims have demonstrated that judicial
conceptions of homeless individuals as either involuntarily
relegated to that status, or arriving there as a consequence of their
own voluntary acts, is a pivotal and sometimes determinative
question.67  In the 1980s, judges tended to view homeless
individuals as responsible for their homelessness, but also helpless
58. Baker, supra note 12, at 428; Bella & Lopez, supra note 27, at 109.
59. Foscarinis, supra note 17, at 16-17.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 26-49.
62. Bella & Lopez, supra note 27, at 94-100; Foscarinis, supra note 17, at 27-
30.
63. Focarinis, supra note 17, at 27.
64. Id. at 31.
65. Bella & Lopez, supra note 27, at 113-21; Watson, supra note 17, at 508-11.
66. Bella & Lopez, supra note 27, at 100-107; Foscarinis, supra note 17, at 34-
49.
67. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 57.
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to the extent that they were generally incapable of changing their
current situation.68 Following the failure of various initiatives
that aimed to eliminate homelessness, subsequent reductions in
program funding, and increasing criminalization of homelessness,
judges began to view homelessness as not only a voluntarily
contracted condition, but one in which individuals remained
voluntarily. 69 An examination of more recent cases has revealed a
link between a judge's view of homelessness as voluntary or
involuntary and the ultimate decision in a case:
Courts that find homelessness to be involuntary will tend to
strike down public-sleeping restrictions, making the particular
argument that such restrictions punish the homeless for an
involuntary status and thus constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Courts
that find homelessness not to be an involuntary status
contend that it is entirely legitimate for governments to ban
public sleeping and camping.70
The judicial determination that homelessness was either
voluntarily or involuntarily acquired may be bypassed if a court
chooses to apply a standard exempting life-sustaining acts.
Although this approach has been explored in a scholarly context, 71
it has not been widely adopted.
II. Jones v. City of Los Angeles
Jones held that punishment of involuntary sitting, lying, or
sleeping on public sidewalks constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 72  The
Appellants', who lived in the Skid Row area between two and forty
years, 78 descriptions of their lives revealed a broad spectrum of the
causes of homelessness. Most had limited mobility or were unable
to stay employed due to their own or their spouse's physical or
mental deficiencies. 74 Some were either receiving benefits that
were insufficient to pay for a room in a motel every night, or they
68. Wes Daniels, "Derelicts," Recurring Misfortune, Economic Hard Times and
Lifestyle Choices: Judicial Images of Homeless Litigants and Implications for Legal
Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 687, 695-96 (1997).
69. Id. at 697-98.
70. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 57.
71. Walters, supra note 27, at 1641-45.
72. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).
73. Id. at 1124-25.
74. Id.
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had recently lost their benefits.7 5 In light of these circumstances,
the court concluded that appellants "are not on the streets of Skid
Row by informed choice."76
To reach its conclusion, the court reviewed the availability of
housing in Los Angeles and found that there was insufficient
space available in hotels, shelters, and other housing, leaving
more than 1,000 persons in Skid Row without shelter each night. 77
In fact, there were nearly 50,000 more homeless people than
available shelter beds in all of Los Angeles County. 78 Next, the
court determined that the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the city should be reviewed de novo.7 9
In addition to challenging the Appellants' claim that §
41.18(d) violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, the city challenged Appellants'
standing.8 0 The city argued that Appellants lacked standing
because they had not yet been convicted under the ordinance.8 1
The court noted that only the first two types of protections against
cruel and unusual punishment described in Ingraham require a
conviction.8 2 The third type of protection, which limits "what the
state can criminalize," applies prior to conviction.8 3
The city presented an alternative challenge to the Appellants'
standing with the argument that if the appellants actually faced
prosecution they had the option of raising a necessity defense.8 4
The court found that the availability of the necessity defense did
not obviate Appellants' standing for three reasons. First, the pre-
conviction harms suffered by Appellants, such as loss of personal
property, established standing regardless of whether prosecution
was pursued.85 Second, the realities of homelessness, such as lack
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1123.
77. Id. at 1122.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1125-26. The City disputed this point, arguing that because the
district court denied a request for equitable relief, the abuse of discretion standard
should apply. Id. at 1125.
80. Id. at 1126.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1128.
83. Id. The court also noted that two of the six appellants had been convicted
and sentenced for violation of § 41.18(d), and reasoned in the alternative that if a
conviction was required, the convictions of two of the appellants established
standing for them all. Id at 1130.
84. Id. at 1126.
85. Id. at 1131.
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of knowledge and access to counsel, a high incidence of mental
illness, substance abuse problems, unemployment, and poverty
made reliance on a necessity defense impractical, and these
realities in combination with incentives to plead guilty in
exchange for immediate release make resort to a necessity defense
unlikely.8 6 Finally, the court expressed a concern with "the policy
of arresting, jailing, and prosecuting individuals whom the City
Attorney concedes cannot be convicted due to a necessity
defense."8 7  Specifically, the court questioned whether such a
concession amounted to an admission that the arrest and
detainment of homeless people constituted "police harassment of a
vulnerable population."8 8
After establishing the Appellants' standing, the court then
examined their claims that enforcement of § 41.18(d) violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
First, the court read Robinson as establishing that "[a]t a
minimum.., the state may not punish a person for who he is,
independent of anything he has done."8 9 Next, the court examined
the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Powell and
observed that "five Justices... understood Robinson to stand for
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state
from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the
unavoidable consequence of one's status or being."90 Although the
plurality opinion in Powell "interpreted Robinson to prohibit only
the criminalization of pure status and not to limit the
criminalization of conduct,"91 the four dissenting Justices as well
as Justice White's concurrence focused on the voluntary or
involuntary nature of the behavior. 92 Following these readings of
Robinson and Powell, the court articulated a two-part analysis for
determining the limits of the Eighth Amendment on the state's
power to criminalize. The behavior targeted by the statute or
ordinance should be assessed as either pure status or pure





89. Id. at 1133.
90. Id. at 1135.
91. Id. at 1133.
92. Id. at 1133-34.
93. Id. at 1136.
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After applying this test to the facts, the court found that
"enforcement of section 41.18(d) at all times and in all places
against homeless individuals who are sitting, lying, or sleeping in
Los Angeles's Skid Row because they cannot obtain shelter
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause."94 The court
found the targeted behaviors to be involuntary regardless of
whether they were termed "acts" or "conditions" because "they are
universal and unavoidable consequences of being human."95 The
behavior was also indistinguishable from status because "human
beings are biologically compelled to rest" and homeless persons
have no private place in which to do S0.96
In conclusion, the court emphasized that the holding was
limited to the specific facts of the case.97 The ordinance was not
invalid on its face, and the court drew no conclusion about the
enforcement of a similar ordinance when beds were available in
shelters.98 Appellants in this case "had no choice other than to be
on the streets."99 The court stated, "so long as there is a greater
number of homeless individuals in Los Angeles than the number
of available beds, the City may not enforce section 41.18(d) at all
times and places throughout the City against homeless individuals
for involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in public." 100
III. Jones: An Obstacle for the Homeless
Since the circuits conflict in their treatment of challenges to
anti-homeless ordinances, 10 ' in order to operate as persuasive
authority favoring the rights of homeless persons, opinions that
find these statutes inapplicable must be both grounded in
precedent and logically reasonable. The Jones majority offers a
well-founded interpretation of the standing issue, but its
treatment of the status issue results in a test that is more oblique
and confusing than the already conflicting precedent.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1136.
97. Id. at 1137-38.
98. Id. at 1138.
99. Id. at 1137.
100. Id. at 1138.
101. Compare Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 856-58 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (holding that San Francisco's Matrix Program targets conduct, not
status, and the Eighth Amendment's protections do not apply), with Pottinger v.
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that arresting the
homeless for life-sustaining acts constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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A. The Majority's Disposition of the Standing Issues is
Proper
The majority rejected the city's claim that Appellants lacked
standing because they had not been convicted 10 2 and read
Ingraham to support its conclusion that part of the Eighth
Amendment's protections against cruel and unusual punishment
apply prior to conviction. This conclusion, however, is not obvious
from an initial reading of Ingraham. The court in Ingraham
observed that "the principal concern of the American Framers
appears to have been with the legislative definition of crimes and
punishments,"'10 3 and this observation laid the foundation for the
Ingraham Court's ultimate conclusion that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, in addition to limiting the type and severity
of punishment, limits the legislative definition of criminal acts. 0 4
The conclusion that the Eighth Amendment limits the
legislative definition of crimes, however, does not answer the
question of whether a person must be convicted of a crime to have
standing to challenge the legislative definition. As the Jones
majority noted, certain dicta in Ingraham, when taken out of
context, support the conclusion that a conviction is necessary to
invoke review under the Eighth Amendment.' 0 For example, the
Ingraham Court's initial premise in its review of the history of the
Eighth Amendment was that "the proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment.., was designed to protect those convicted of
crimes.' 106 The Court also noted that "the State does not acquire
the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is
concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of
guilt . ,.o"107
Read in isolation from the facts of Ingraham it would be easy
to conclude from these statements that the Eighth Amendment's
protections only extend to convicted persons. However, an
intratextual reading of the opinion, emphasizing the facts of the
case as detailed above, lends support to the opposite
interpretation. The issue in Ingraham was "whether the paddling
of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes
102. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006).
103. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977).
104. See id. at 667.
105. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1128.
106. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
107. Id. at 671-72 n.40.
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cruel and unusual punishment . . .,"108 that is, whether
noncriminal punishment is subject to the limits imposed by the
Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the first statement should be read
with emphasis on the requirement that a crime be involved, not
that a conviction was obtained. 10 9  In support of this
interpretation, the Court went on to state that "the exclusive
concern of the English version was the conduct of judges in
enforcing the criminal law,"110 and that "the subject to which [the
cruel and unusual punishment clause] was intended to apply [was]
the criminal process." ' With regard to the second statement, the
"power to punish" proscribed by the first two phrases of the
Court's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, which limit the type and severity of punishment, must be
viewed as distinct from the power to criminalize, which is
restricted by the third phrase's limit on "what can be made
criminal and punished as such."'112 Once this distinction is made,
the second statement merely confirms that the limits on the type
and severity of punishment require a conviction.113
A conclusion that the Eighth Amendment was designed to
protect only those persons convicted of crimes is contrary to the
breadth of the Ingraham Court's historical findings regarding the
Founders' purposes behind the Amendment. The Ingraham Court
concluded that the Founders were concerned with the imposition
of improper punishment not only by judges but also "by
legislatures engaged in making the laws."'1 14 The Jones majority's
conclusion that the Plaintiffs had standing was based on a careful
and insightful reading of Ingraham, but it was by no means
obvious. In his dissent, Justice Rymer interpreted the same
language examined above to conclude that a conviction was
required for standing under the Eighth Amendment." 5 The
majority's treatment of the issue may not generally cure the
108. Id. at 653.
109. See id. at 665-66 (discussing the distinction between the commission of a
crime and the conviction of crime).
110. Id. at 665.
111. Id. at 666.
112. Id. at 667.
113. See also Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667) (1977)) (noting that the Ingraham
decision "expressly recognizes that the Clause imposes substantive limits on what
can be made criminal").
114. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 665.
115. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1140-44 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
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homeless plaintiffs' standing problems because in different factual
circumstances courts have used a lack of standing to defeat
homeless plaintiffs' claims,116 but the Court's analysis on the
question of the requirement of a conviction is persuasive and may
prove influential.
B. The Majority's Disposition of the Status Issue is Flawed
The Jones majority's reading of precedent on the status issue
is as insightful as its reading on the standing issue. Yet, the
problem with this opinion, both as a judicial tool and as a method
for recognizing the rights of homeless persons, lies in the fact that
the test the majority devises, though grounded in precedent, is
confusing and difficult to apply.
The Jones Court compared the plurality, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Powell to divine the prevailing meaning of
the Robinson decision,11 7 and legal scholars have similarly
searched these opinions for a common thread and found more in
common between the concurring and dissenting opinions than the
plurality. 118 The practice of discerning the legal principles adopted
by a majority of justices, regardless of the functional holding in the
case, is a well-established method of case analysis. Thus, while
the decisiveness with which the Jones Court states its conclusion
is not shared by all scholars and circuits,1 1 9 it is persuasive.
Justice White's concurrence in Powell is replete with
references to the ability of alcoholics to choose not to drink and
116. See, e.g., Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1341 (11th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that homeless plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin the City's use
of building codes and zoning ordinances to close homeless shelters).
117. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1132-36.
118. See Greenawalt, supra note 31, at 931 (noting that "the dissent comes closer
to stating the principles accepted by a majority of the Court");Walters, supra note
27, at 1627 (noting that the Powell plurality is not binding precedent, and the
plurality's emphasis on conduct is inconsistent with Robinson).
119. See Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 856-58 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (rejecting the Paintiffs' contention that five Justices in Powell conducted an
inquiry based on voluntariness, adopting the Powell plurality's status-condition
test, and characterizing White's concurrence as largely dicta); Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (distinguishing the facts of Powell
by observing that the homeless Paintiffs at issue "have no realistic choice but to
live in public places," and reading White's concurrence to support relief in such
circumstances); Benno Weisberg, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the
Eighth Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other
Contextual "Crimes", J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 338-39 (2005) (noting that
Justice White's concurrence conflicted with the plurality's limitation of Robinson,
but concluding that the import of White's concurrence was inconclusive).
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control themselves while drinking.120 The dissent similarly
emphasizes voluntariness. 121 The Jones Court could have stopped
with these observations and adopted a volitional inquiry by
viewing Powell as a refinement or modification of Robinson.
Instead it complicated its own inquiry by formulating a two-prong
test based equally in these two cases, by analyzing the facts first
for both their voluntary or involuntary nature and subsequently
for their classification as either status or conduct. 122
The Court declared that application of this test to the facts
produces clear results: the targeted behavior is punished in
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause because it
is involuntary and it is closer to pure status because it is conduct
indistinguishable from status.123 But even applying the majority's
test, the dissent does not reach the same "clear" finding, 124 and the
majority's own logic in reaching these conclusions is muddled.125
The conclusion that conduct is indistinguishable from status does
not dictate a finding that punishment of status is present, 126 and
even if it does, the Court's opinion provides no guidelines for
determining when conduct becomes indistinguishable from status.
Without more, other courts or judges applying this test in the
future are left to their own devices in determining whether a
statutorily based prohibition constitutes status or conduct, unless
the circumstances are identical to those present in Jones. This
unguided inquiry into the distinction between conduct and status
is, in effect, the same as having no judicial test at all.
C. A Derivative Inquiry: The Volitional Test
The majority's conclusion that the conduct at issue is
indistinguishable from status stems from its determination that
120. See supra note 39.
121. See supra note 36.
122. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006).
123. See id. at 1136-37.
124. See id. at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1136-37 (concluding that conduct is involuntary because it is
biologically compelled, and because the plaintiffs have no private place for this
biologically compelled action, their conduct is indistinguishable from status).
126. See id. at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor any
other circuit court of appeals has ever held that conduct derivative of a status may
not be criminalized."). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring) ("[For alcoholics without homes] resisting drunkenness is impossible
and.., avoiding public places when intoxicated is also impossible. As applied to
them this statute is in effect a law which bans a single act for which they may not
be convicted under the Eighth Amendment - the act of getting drunk.").
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the condition is involuntary. 127 In light of this reasoning, it may
be simpler to eliminate the test's second prong altogether, and
instead use a volitional inquiry. Under the Jones majority's
interpretation of Powell, five of nine Justices conducted a similar
inquiry. 128  Nonetheless, a volitional test is not without its
problems for both homeless plaintiffs, explored in Section E below,
and for the courts. Most importantly, the question arises: Which
voluntary or involuntary act should be the subject of the inquiry -
that of acquiring the condition or status, or that of the proscribed
act?
The Powell plurality made some inquiry into the
voluntariness of the disease of alcoholism,' 29 but that analysis was
subsumed by the ultimate conclusion that an "act" was being
punished.130 White's concurrence implies an inquiry not into
whether the homeless person could have avoided sleep, but into
whether the homeless person could have avoided sleeping in
public.1 3' In contrast, Black's concurrence rejects a voluntariness
inquiry altogether.132 Finally, the dissent's conclusion that
Powell's disease meant he could not be deterred by the statute133
seems to translate in the context of homelessness into an inquiry
of whether homeless people can avoid sleep.
These opinions do not provide courts guidance in choosing
between focusing on the volitional nature of the initial cause of
homelessness, of the particular act, or of the public nature of that
act. Certainly courts have examined the initial causes of
homelessness--but should homeless persons be treated differently
depending on how they became homeless? Should a homeless
person with physical or mental disabilities be given preferential
treatment over a homeless person who ran out of money as the
result of a drug addiction, or a homeless person who came up short
127. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136-37.
128. See id. at 1135.
129. Powell, 392 U.S. at 522-26 (plurality opinion) (discussing the indecision
among medical experts about the characterization of alcoholism as a disease).
130. Id. at 532.
131. See id. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 540 (Black, J., concurring) ("I could not, however, consider any
findings that could be made with respect to 'voluntariness' or 'compulsion'
controlling on the question [of] whether a specific instance of human behavior
should be immune from punishment as a constitutional matter.").
133. Id. at 568 n.31 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("I also read these findings to mean
that appellant's disease is such that he cannot be deterred by Article 477 of the
Texas Penal Code from drinking to excess and from appearing in public while
intoxicated.").
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on their rent because they lost her job or missed a deadline to
receive government aid?
The consequences of this decision are far-reaching. Courts
who focus on the volitional nature of the cause of the plaintiffs
homelessness would render decisions based on acts of that plaintiff
that are far removed from the targeted behavior-sometimes
months or years in the past.134 In light of this temporal disconnect
between the cause of homelessness and the targeted behavior,
placing sole emphasis on the voluntariness of becoming homeless
is almost certainly impermissible.1 35 Furthermore, narrowing the
inquiry to the "cause of homelessness" does not clearly direct the
court's examination. Rather, such an inquiry leaves courts to
weigh the importance of a person's poor work performance against
larger economic factors that could have effected their chances of
losing their job, or to weigh the decision to try the addictive drug
for the first time with the compulsion to continue and spend all
you own to get it-investigations that require an assignment of a
degree of culpability that not even experienced judges are
qualified to make.
Courts focusing on the volitional nature of the particular
targeted act would have to determine to what extent plaintiffs
could resist the targeted behavior. This is a specialized inquiry
that may require testimony from medical or psychiatric experts,
and it risks the temptation to uphold a conviction because experts
or data in these fields conflict.1 36
Courts focusing on the volitional nature of the public
character of the targeted behavior would need to focus on whether
plaintiffs could have found a private place for these acts.
Typically, this would require an extensive showing of the
(un)availability of several discrete shelters, a hurdle which would
134. See, e.g., id. at 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring) (discussing Robinson v.
California in which the Court dealt with "a statute which makes the 'status' of
narcotic addiction a criminal offense" and stating that "[b]y precluding criminal
conviction for such a 'status' the Court was dealing with a condition brought about
by acts remote in time from the application of the criminal sanctions contemplated,
a condition which was relatively permanent in duration, and a condition of great
magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and values.") (citation
omitted).
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., id. at 522-27 (plurality opinion) (surveying medical opinions as to
whether alcoholism should be considered a disease, and determining there was no




be difficult for plaintiffs of modest resources to overcome. 137
Forcing a determination as to a plaintiffs culpability to turn on
the government's decision to provide shelter could put the
government in an untenable position when deciding how to
allocate its budgetary expenditures. 138
Removing the conduct-status examination from the Jones
test only eliminates part of the confusion. An examination of
volition is also flawed, not because it is ambiguous, but because so
many independent acts and factors result in a homeless person
sleeping in the street and it is not clear on which of these acts
courts should focus. While support for both a status inquiry and a
volitional inquiry can be found in Robinson and Powell, the
inability of courts to use these tests consistently brings their
utility into question.
D. An Alternative Inquiry: The Life-Sustaining Acts Test
An alternative to both the conduct-status and the volitional
inquiries is one based on the necessity of the conduct, that is,
whether the act engaged in was life-sustaining. Edward J.
Walters first described this life-sustaining act exemption. 39
Walters described application of these statutes in life-or-death
situations as "manifestly cruel and unusual."' 40  Where the
homeless person, in so acting, is effectively choosing to stay alive,
the choice is not meaningful and should not be punished.'4 ' In
Walter's view, introducing this exemption makes up for any lack of
a necessity defense that had been available at common law. 142 In
Walter's formulation, courts would have to distinguish between a
"seemingly compelled choice" and "no choice at all."' 43 Not all acts
of homeless people would be protected. For example, not only
137. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006)
(finding "a strong evidentiary showing of a substantial shortage of shelter."). But
see id. at 1140 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (finding that the Plaintiffs had not produced
a showing "that shelter was unavailable on the night[s]" Plaintiffs were
apprehended).
138. Id. at 1139 (Rymer, J., dissenting) ('The ramifications of so holding are
quite extraordinary. We do not-and should not-immunize from criminal liability
those who commit an act as a result of a condition that the government's failure to
provide a benefit has left them in.").
139. Walters, supra note 27, at 1620.
140. Id. at 1641.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1644.
143. Id. at 1643.
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would acts that were truly not life-or-death, such as panhandling
or bathing in public, not be protected, but if sufficient shelter were
available, homeless people choosing not to utilize the shelter
would be subject to criminal punishment.1 44 Walter justifies this
exemption by noting first, that life-sustaining acts cannot be
deterred, and second, that these acts are not morally
blameworthy.145
It is worth noting that, under Walter's life-sustaining act
test, the Jones case would most likely have had the same result,
with a majority finding that the Plaintiffs had shown a lack of
available shelter and the dissent concluding that there was no
showing of unavailability. This test thus does not seem to solve at
least part of the problems associated with the volitional or the
conduct-status test.146 For this reason, a modified version of the
life-sustaining act test is warranted: one for which truly life-
sustaining acts are exempted from criminal sanction, without
exception for cases in which public shelter was available. Of the
tests already examined, this test may be characterized as the most
protective of homeless rights of the tests already examined
because it has the advantage of being clear, predictable, and
subject to minimal judicial abuse. Judicial classification of an act
as either life sustaining or not is presumably simpler than the
classification of such an act as conduct, status, or conduct
derivative of status. 147 In terms of advancing the interests of the
homeless, it also serves as an incentive for cities to provide higher
quality shelters for a greater number of homeless people. 148
144. Id. at 1643-44.
145. Id. at 1644.
146. See supra Part I.B. (noting that the absence of clear guidelines results in
the majority and dissent in Jones come to opposite conclusions under the majority's
test, and leaves future courts without aid in deciding whether a behavior is status
or conduct).
147. See Walters, supra note 27, at 1646-48; see also id. at 1648 (characterizing
the live-or-die standard as a "limiting principle for the status crimes doctrine").
148. If the availability of shelter does not determine whether or not homeless
persons may be arrested for sleeping in public, cities will be forced to improve the
quality of shelter to attract homeless persons. Homeless persons may choose not to
seek room in a shelter for a variety of reasons. See infra note 151. Shelters may be
undesirable because they charge daily fees, require users to leave during the day,




E. Hollow Victory: The Limits and Contradictions of the
Majority's Holding
The decision in Jones could impact future challenges to anti-
homeless statutes in several ways. First, as noted above, the
majority limited its holding to situations where petitioners can
provide a strong showing that they had no choice other than to be
on the streets, or i.e., that there were no beds available in
shelters.149 Problems in making such a showing-illustrated by
the fact that the majority finds "uncontested evidence" of such,
while the dissent finds no showing at all-may hamstring future
challenges, especially by a population with limited resources.
Second, the negative implication of basing its decision on the
showing of an unavailability of shelter is that cities could, in
effect, force homeless persons into shelters if they provide enough
beds and make sleeping in public a crime. 150 The Court made no
such conclusion, but forced use of shelters could prove to be a
serious problem for homeless persons, as the desirability of a
shelter available to homeless persons depends on the rate of theft
and assault and the personal comforts available. 51 An extreme
reading of this decision could force homeless persons into shelters
where they enjoy less safety than they do on the streets.
Finally, this test is easy to manipulate based on judicial
preferences for or against homeless persons. While a simpler way
to deny Eighth Amendment protection to the homeless is to
declare the prohibited behavior to be an act and not a status, 152 a
subtler way is to adopt an unclear test, the guidelines of which are
indistinct. 53 As judicial decisions have changed with evolving
149. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006).
150. Posted by Steve Vladek to Prawfsblog,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/04/ishomelessness.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2006).
151. Some homeless persons refuse to utilize drop-in shelters out of fear for their
own safety or property. See Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp 843, 849
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (Plaintiff refused to sleep at a drop-in shelter because "[t]hese
people that you're laying next to, they're not saints."). Others do not use shelters
due to the restrictions placed on them there. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30
F.3d 1332, 1341 (11th Cir. 1994) (Plaintiff did not stay in shelters because he "had
more rights in jail than he did there.").
152. See Joyce, 846 F. Supp. 843 (holding that the Eighth Amendment
protections did not apply because authorities were targeting conduct, not status).
153. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1139 (Rymer J., dissenting) (finding that Plaintiffs'
challenge failed "even on the majority's view of the law"). Using the Jones
majority's test, a court could, like the dissent, decide there is no showing of a lack
of available housing in order to foreclose Eighth Amendment relief. Id. at 1139-40.
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attitudes toward homelessness,1 5 4  indistinct guidelines are
particularly dangerous as homelessness is a particularly
ambiguous area of law. While the result in Jones was positive for
these particular Appellants, in future applications the test and the
limits of the holding may present significant hurdles for homeless
persons.
Conclusion
Jones represents yet another chapter in the litigation of anti-
homeless statutes. While the Court in Jones seems predisposed to
rule in favor of the homeless Plaintiffs, the test it develops is
ambiguous and could be applied with equal ease to deny homeless
claims as to grant them. The negative implications of the
ruling-raising the evidentiary requirements of complaints made
by the homeless and even requiring homeless persons to resort to
city shelters if provided, no matter what the condition-may even
exacerbate the plight of the homeless population. A test that is
more protective of a homeless person's right to survive, providing a
complete exemption for truly life-sustaining acts, is preferable in
an area of law that is already confusing.
154. Daniels, supra note 68, at 695-98.
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